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Progressive realism and the EU’s international actorness: 
towards a grand strategy?  
Abstract 
The EU lacks a coherent strategy to guide its international actions. This is a problem that has 
been amply discussed in both academic and policy-making circles, but that remains to be 
fully addressed. The December 2013 European Council recognised the issue, and the EU 
High Representative Federica Mogherini is in charge of a strategic review that will lead to a 
Global Strategy by June 2016. Most arguments in favour of a grand strategy rely on 
utilitarian arguments that highlight the EU’s potential for a more efficient foreign policy. By 
linking a progressive realist approach to the importance of a EU grand strategy, this article 
intends to demonstrate the normative need for such a guiding document. As it will be argued, 
a grand strategy is a necessary step in the consolidation of the EU as a pluralist post-national 
polity that has in the fulfilment of its citizens’ interests its raison d’être.   
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Almost two and a half decades after Maastricht, and one after Lisbon, the EU remains an 
international actor attempting to assert its presence in the world. It sees itself and is often 
seen as acting according to high moral standards in the international stage; as a normative or 
civilian power that acts as a force for good (Manners 2002, 2008, 2015; Whitman 1998), but 
that ultimately lacks a comprehensive strategic approach to guide its actions (Edwards 2013). 
Neither the EU is able to act decisively in the world stage, nor do its member states have the 
capacity to do it alone (Menon 2014: 18). As an international actor the EU acts in an ad hoc 
manner, too often with limited political results. 
Unlike other works on EU grand strategy (Smith 2011; Howorth 2010), it is not the aim of 
this article to discuss the details of what an EU grand strategy should include. Rather, this 
article intends, from a progressive realist perspective, to focus on the political relevance of 
creating one. In that context, it will be argued that, more important than the often discussed 
pragmatic reasons for the EU to adopt a grand strategy, there are reasons of normative stance 
that should be part of the discussion; reasons that relate directly to the EU’s political raison 
d'être and to its condition of post-national pluralist polity. Only with a grand strategy, this 
article argues, can European citizens learn and contest the EU's vital interestsi i.e., can they 
 actively exert their European citizenship. Methodologically this implies developing a grand 
strategy based on more than the lowest common denominator between member states and EU 
institutions; a grand strategy that Europeans and non-Europeans alike would take as the basis 
for the EU’s role in the world; one with a political weight equivalent to US’ National 
Security Strategy (Andersson 2015).  
This problem was recognised in the December 2013 European Council when it was agreed 
that the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs should, together with the 
European Commission, ‘assess the impact of changes in the global environment, and to 
report to the Council in the course of 2015ii on the challenges and opportunities arising for 
the Union […]’ (2013: 4). The High Representative Federica Mogherini has undertaken a 
strategic review that have resulted in a number of reports, including a report on the current 
global strategic environment, a joint report with the Commissioner for Internal Market, 
Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs Elżbieta Bieńkowska on the European Defence and 
Technological Industrial Base and a report on the EU’s activities in security and defence 
since December 2013. These last two were discussed at the Foreign Affairs Council in May 
2015, while the report on the global strategic environment was presented at the European 
Council the following month, and constituted the basis for member states to request the High 
Representative to ‘continue the process of strategic reflection with a view to preparing an EU 
global strategy on foreign and security policy in close cooperation with Member States, to be 
submitted to the European Council by June 2016’ (European Council, 2015: 5). 
 
As the paramount intellectual tradition in International Relations, it would certainly be 
expected that the EU had been amply discussed within realism. However, not only those 
studying the EU rarely consider realism’s theoretical insights (Rynning 2005: 4) as realist 
authors do not frequently engage with the problems and issues affecting the EU (Morgan 
2005: 203; Peters 2010: 8). Maybe it is because realism brings a certain uneasiness to the 
‘dominant liberal values’ associated with the EU (Hyde-Price 2007: 2). As a result, rather 
than being dominant, the realist literature on the EU is placed in a secondary position, rarely 
useful and often criticised for its inadequacy to the study of European-related matters: a 
Westphalian theory that does not belong to the post-Westphalian actorness of the EU (see 
Cooper 2004; Morgan 2005). 
This article explores realism as a prescriptive, normative and progressive school of thought 
that has since the Second World War attempted to raise important ethical-political questions 
about the role of war and diplomacy in the international system; a tradition of thought that is 
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 inherently European, despite its American appropriation and transformation. A few other 
authors (Hyde-Price 2008; Rynning 2011) have used classical realist ethicaliii arguments in 
favour of a prudent EU foreign and security policy. However, they have sufficiently explored 
neither the progressive dimension of classical realism (much less of its revival authors) nor 
the connection between the internal legitimacy of EU’s actions and the importance of an EU 
grand strategy in that context. 
Progressive realism is the label given by William Scheuerman iv to the political thought of 
authors normally associated with classical realism, such as Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans 
Morgenthau or John Herz. These are authors whose paramount concerns ‘with the 
construction of a plural and vibrant public sphere’ (Tjalve 2008: 7) were often forgotten in 
favour of the ‘moral cynicism of power politics Henry Kissinger-style or […] the rationalism 
of neorealist theory’ (Tjalve 2008:138). This label could also be extended to a recent 
generation of authors that brought back to life the theoretical, political and philosophical 
sophistication of these classical authors as an attempt to find answers or guidance, to some of 
the most prominent issues of our time: the global war on terror (Tjalve 2008), the 
obsolescence of the nation state (Scheuerman 2011) or the political and economic hegemony 
of liberalism (Booth 2011 and Williams 2005; 2011).  
Applying this classical realism revival - or, as put by Sten Rynning, the ‘return of the Jedi’ 
(2005: 3) - to the study of the EU’s international actorness involves framing the normative 
debate on the EU as an international actor in a realist approach that simultaneously highlights 
the perils and the need for a united Europe in the international stage. In particular, it intends 
to highlight how the EU’s international actorness should be linked to the definition of a grand 
strategy that reflects both the interests of its people and the necessary restrains imposed by 
the interaction with the other actors in the international system.  
Contra neorealism, it will be argued that an analysis merely based on the European 
articulations of power misses the constitutive importance the EU’s external activities have in 
the development of a plural and democratic European polity. The definition of a grand 
strategy is here seen as a fundamental step to open up the debate about the EU’s essential 
interests, and thus contribute to the progressive formation of a European public spherev. In a 
period of rising Euroscepticism, a grand strategy could be seen as a key step in bringing the 
EU closer to its citizens. In that sense, the development of a foreign policy that is based on 
the fulfilment of the EU’s vital interests, defined according to the established needs and goals 
of the Europeans is s fundamental element in the constitution of a EU international actorness 
that is seen as legitimate both by its international peers, and by its own people.  
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 Instead of directly focusing on realism’s ‘founding fathers’, this article follows the above-
mentioned intellectual movement of classical realism revival. The justification for this is 
simple: the intention is not to understand what Hans Morgenthau, E.H. Carr or John Herz had 
to say about the EU but a) how the body of thought they have developed has been recently 
reinterpreted, and b) how that reinterpretation can shed light on the current state of the 
European project, particularly in its international dimension. These scholars’ reinterpretation 
of classical realist thought, offer a more accurate notion of how these ‘classical’ ideas were 
filtered by key contemporary International Relations’ authors in their own right, such as 
Michael C. Williams and William Scheuermanvi. By looking into the reinterpretation of these 
texts, it is possible to disclose their ‘new truths that possibly open up for new political 
practices’ (Pram Gad and Lund Petersen 2011: 321) and apply them to the study of the EU as 
as an international actor.  
In terms of structure, the article starts with a brief overview of the (mostly structural and 
neoclassical) realist literature on the EU and its foreign policy. From here, it delves into the 
works of contemporary classical realist authors assessing their motivations in rescuing the 
classical realist tradition and the resulting understanding of both the European integration 
project (this point will draw heavily from Scheuerman’s work on global statehood) and the 
logic of its international actorness. The final section focuses on the importance of a EU grand 
strategy as a means to re-centre Europe’s external priorities and to politically legitimise its 
actions next to its own citizens. 
 
Realism and the European Union 
Whether understood as a ‘discourse of disillusionment, motivated by the attempt to 
understand the horrors of the twentieth century’ (Bell 2008: 7) or as ‘the attempt, repeated 
and repeatedly failed, to translate the maxims of nineteenth century’s European diplomatic 
practice into more general laws of an American social science’ (Guzzini 1998: 1), realism is 
considered the dominant paradigm in International Relations. This disciplinary centrality has 
however led to its simplification and frequent construction of ideal types that attempt to 
merge different theoretical backgrounds into one ‘theory’, thus hiding important theoretical 
distinctions and nuances (Scheuerman 2010: 273) and over-simplifying the complexity of the 
theoretical contributions of key authors such as Carr, Morgenthau and Wight (Molloy 2006: 
2). 
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 Despite the underlying European cultural background to realism (particularly to its mid-
century classical authors) it is the US structural realist ‘version’ that has been most applied to 
the EU (Hyde-Price 2007; Jones 2007; Rosato 2010). Neorealist authors (both in the 
defensive and offensive forms) usually understand European security as substantiated on an 
internal balance of powervii. For this realist literature, the EU serves three different purposes 
to its member states: it promotes their economic interests in the global economy; it helps 
them shape the regional milieu; and it ‘serves as the institutional repository of the second-
order normative concerns of EU member states’ (Hyde-Price 2008: 31). In that sense, the EU 
is a mere institutional arrangement with a limited hold on core security issues, and its foreign 
policy is ‘little more than the sum of its parts’ (Bickerton 2011: 172). The integration process 
was, following this approach, only possible due to the strong US presence in the continent 
(Hyde-Price 2007: 67). Without the US security umbrella the European project would have 
fallen apart (Merlingen 2012: 13) and ‘Europe would go from benign bipolarity to 
unbalanced multipolarity’ (Mearsheimer 2001: 52)viii.  
Another common claim among neorealists is the idea that the EU can constitute an 
alternative pole of power (Posen 2006)ix. According to this argument, the EU plays the 
double game of being able to be autonomous from the US (and therefore a potential 
alternative pole of power in the international system) when their interests are not 
coincidental, while also being able to leverage its influence in Washington by showing it is 
capable of going it alone (Art 2004). Even if flattering for the EU, such assumptions would 
be in stark contrast with the recent past, as recognised by Art himself when mentioning the 
EU incapacity to decisively intervene in any of the Balkans’ wars (Art 2004). In reality, 
when it comes to balancing, the EU would have to be seen as a below-par competitor of the 
US. More than two decades since the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) there still is, using Christopher Hill’s (1993) famous expression, a ‘capability-
expectations’ gap in Europe (see Witney 2008; Stokes and Whitman 2013).  
While these realist accounts re-centre the issue of power into the studies of EU’s external 
relations, they do fail to go much beyond neorealism’s parsimonious explanatory value. For 
them, it is the balance of power (or interests, or threats, depending on the realist author one 
follows) that ultimately defines the EU’s (or the EU great powers’) actions in the 
international stage.  
More recently, there have been a few works linking the EU to what is known as neoclassical 
realism (Costalli 2009; Dyson 2010). The neorealist view(s) on the EU, and particularly its 
security and defence policy are not necessarily coincidental with the neoclassical take on the 
 5 
 subject (see Dyson 2010). Despite sharing the neorealist positivist approach to science, 
neoclassical realism attempts to reconcile some of the aspects highlighted in classical realism 
with neorealist theory. As argued by Tom Dyson, it ‘combines neorealism’s emphasis on the 
“survival” motivation of states, with classical realism’s focus on the dependence of political 
leaders on domestic society for material resources and support for foreign and defence policy 
goals’ (2010: 120). Thus, even though neoclassical realists maintain that states are 
conditioned by the structure of international anarchy in their foreign policy assessments 
(Costalli 2009: 327), they also understand ‘that people and institutions with long and 
complex histories (the intervening variables) actually make policy’ (Rynning 2011: 33), and 
that these intervening variables mediate between power pressure and agency (Costalli 2009: 
327). 
Neoclassical realism could, in that regard, be understood as an improvement in terms of its 
ability to explain the EU internal and external dynamics. However, its capacity to introduce a 
political-ethical assessment of the EU as an international actor it remains very limited. Here, 
classical realism has a clear advantage over its ‘neo’ successors. Even authors sympathetic 
with neorealism such as Hyde-Price, need to go back to classical realist authors, focusing on 
the need for prudence, scepticism and reciprocity when attempting to advance beyond this 
explanatory field (Hyde-Price 2008: 42). However, by attempting to bring together the 
classical ethics of prudence with a neorealist understanding of the world, Hyde-Price falls in 
an ontological and epistemological trap that places under the same label two opposite 
understandings of the world, theory and agency. It blends the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ (Snyder 2011) 
common in classical realism that Kenneth Waltz (1979) carefully tried to set apart in his 
Theory of International Politics. For, even though Waltz’s neorealism is based on features 
common to classical realism, such as the notion that states are bound by power imperatives 
(Dyson 2010: 97) ‘[b]y making structural power the independent variable, one is not only 
bracketing all the stuff of classical thinking as “intervening” but employing the language of 
causal theory that classical realists abhorred’ (Rynning 2011: 34).  
 
Progressive Realism and Europe as an international actor 
‘Classical’ realism is a nebulous theoretical ensemble that attempts to understand the world 
as it is, with the crudity of power as its essence, but with significant ethical concerns in what 
regards the evolution of the international system. These were (and still are) often prescriptive 
positions attached to strong political (E.H. Carr) and, in some cases, ethical (Reinhold 
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 Niebuhr) commitments, whose normativity would be seen by contemporary realists as too 
non-scientific or even speculative. Contrary to the scientific accuracy of neorealism, ‘[t]here 
are no fixed answers in classical realism. Insights are interpretive and historical and by 
definition contextual’ (Rynning 2011: 32). To an extent, classical realism is more of a 
normative approach than an explanatory theory, one that ‘holds power to be a permanent 
source of temptation’ (Tjalve 2008: 143). More than constructing a specific theory of how 
the world works, classical realism presents particular historically and philosophically 
informed readings of how the world should work and what happens when it does not work as 
it should; readings concerned with the potential clashes between (and limitations of) 
international law, morality and politics.  
Authors such as Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, John Herz or E.H. Carr coined and 
developed concepts such as national interest, balance of power and security dilemma, but 
they did not  
promulgate a cramped view of the national interest, embrace a 
backwards-looking and institutionally conservative model of the 
balance of power, or see the security dilemma as an insurmountable 
barrier to international change (Scheuerman 2011: 15).  
As explained by William Scheuerman, most of these realist authors were linked to 
progressive political movements. Even Morgenthau, who ‘never shared his Frankfurt 
colleagues’ enthusiasm for Marx’ had sympathy for their social and economic reformist 
ambitions (2009: 24). Whereas these were, in Scheuerman’s view, progressive realists, 
Michael C. Williams prefers to use the expression ‘wilful’ to describe the work of these same 
authors. In his own words,  
Wilful Realism is deeply concerned that a recognition of the centrality 
of power in politics does not result in the reduction of politics to pure 
power, and particularly to the capacity to wield violence. It seeks, on 
the contrary, a politics of limits that recognises the destructive and 
productive dimensions of politics, and that maximises its positive 
possibilities while minimizing its destructive potential (2005: 7). 
 
It is a realist approach that attempts to balance, power, politics and progress; a realism that 
does not shy away from the tragedy of politics, while simultaneously acknowledging its true 
emancipatory potential. In spite of some ambiguities in their arguments – mostly related to 
the mid-century US academic context (see Wæver 2011) –, authors such as Hans 
Morgenthau were strong opponents of a purely rational and empirically driven understanding 
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 of politics (Williams 2005: 5). Additionally, they advocated the establishment of relational 
processes (Williams 2005: 6) between different polities that was translatable into ‘a modus 
vivendi and engagement between contrasting values and forms of life’ (Williams 2005: 208). 
Finally, they did not eschew the dilemmas of power politics. They had a deep understanding 
of the constant tension between power and morality, and not only material power but also 
ideational. 
It is in the rejection of absolute truths in politics, in the need to engage with the other and in 
the acknowledgement of the limitations imposed by power that these authors understand the 
possibility of change. Indeed, ‘[t]heir “wilfulness” resides in their unflinching attempts to 
construct a viable, principled understanding of modern politics, and to use this understanding 
to avoid its perils and achieve its promise’ (Williams 2005: 9). Rather than promoting a 
politics of fear as often depicted, ‘classical realists such as Morgenthau sought to counter and 
restrain the role of fear and enmity in political life rather than embracing it’ (Williams 2011 
458). Theirs was a politics of plurality and critical judgment (Williams 2010: 657), for which 
it was essential to formulate clearly defined political interests.  
Power is bound by the interaction of different national polities’ interests. Interests, rather 
than merely power, define the balance of the international system (Rynning 2005: 18). The 
constitution of those interests is defined by a political game centred on political decision-
makers but open to a general audience that debates and questions those previously defined 
political options. In that sense, interest is an important conceptual tool to understand how the 
world is politically constructed. However, it is also a normative concept, in that it specifies 
the need for plurality, both international (as it necessarily acknowledges the diversity of 
national interests) but also internally, as it results from, or is at least influenced by the 
internal plurality of a given political entity. Particularly in Williams’ reading of Morgenthau 
‘the national interest functions as a self-reflexive concept, and a sophisticated analytic and 
rhetorical device attempting to mobilise civic virtue and support a politics of limits’ (2005: 
11). This is the place where power and political openness meet (Williams 2005: 9) as there is 
a transcending dimension to its definition: ‘[t]o ask what the nation’s interests are, is to ask 
what the nation itself stands for’ (Williams 2005:187). As mentioned above, when applied to 
the EU, rather than discussing ‘national’ interest we could discuss ‘European’ interests, those 
that can only be competently addressed - issues related to climate change, financial 
regulation or border management would clearly fall within this category - through a 
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 European collective effort, and that in return define what Europe stands for. Other authors 
have different views about this. For instance, Nathaniel Copsey, reduces Europe’s interests to 
four elements: promotion of its values, particularly peace; open markets; multilateralism; and 
democracy and the rule of law (2015: 187). Although these are commendable goals, they can 
all be subsumed under the promotion of a liberal agenda. They tell us very little about the 
political priorities Europe should assume and the policies it should adopt in its engagement 
with other leading actors’ interests. One could even argue that today’s difficult relations with 
Russia are in part to blame due to the EU’s pursuit of this liberal agenda.  
 A foreign policy that acknowledges the plurality of national interests is a foreign policy that 
recognises the existence of alternative views and values. By recognising them, it is easier to 
avoid indulging in universalistic quests or in reckless foreign policy initiatives that intend ‘to 
radically transform the world’ (Bell 2010: 98). Prudence, is thus a second key concept in the 
classical realist lexicon. Prudence brings together a polity’s national interest and its 
principles as ‘the prudent actor will be attentive to the ways in which his own political 
community results from a complex political history, a recognition that allows for a more 
balanced and less “moralistic” foreign policy’ (Lang Jr., 2007: 19). In a world in which the 
EU is often portrayed as either the champion of universal normative ambitions or as an actor 
incapable of translating its economic robustness into meaningful political power, prudence 
comes as an important political principle that highlights both the dangers of inaction and the 
problems of what Morgenthau would call the ‘crusading spirit’ (1993[1948]: 381). Finally, a 
foreign policy based on a prudent national interest is most likely based on both an internal 
and an external legitimacy as a policy that has the support and/or consent of the domestic and 
international public opinion is certainly a policy with a higher chance of success. In that 
sense, interest, legitimacy and prudence are three key principles that should successfully 
guide the action of a political entity in the world stage.  
The problem for progressive realists already in the late 1940s was that they saw the state as 
increasingly incapable of advancing the interests of its citizens and incompetent to deal with 
the paramount issues in the international agenda (such as the recurring threat of nuclear war), 
most of which were transnational in character. Different political entities and solutions were 
needed, particularly in Europe, the cradle of the most destructive wars in the history of 
humankind.  
Despite the state-centric language, many realist authors were, particularly after the Second 
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 World War, involved in an intellectual debate regarding the viability of a world state, arguing 
in favour of alternative conceptions of human government, distinct from the increasingly 
obsolete nation-state (Scheuerman 2009; 2011). Others were directly involved in promoting 
the European integration process, as was the case of Raymon Aronx. The development of 
nuclear weapons (see Craig 2003) and the increasing identification of transnational problems 
meant that international relations were becoming too important to be left to states.  
As extensively discussed by William Scheuerman there was no necessary consensus on the 
form this global reform process should assume. For both E.H. Carr and Niebuhr the solution 
was a regionally based approach (Scheuerman 2011: 76-79). Hans Morgenthau, on the other 
hand, had an open mind regarding the adoption of cosmopolitan projects (Scheuerman 2009: 
116), but was particularly sceptical of a supranational Europe as it could end up ‘reproducing 
the moral pathologies of existing nation states’ (Morgenthau in Scheuerman 2011: 53). 
Functionalism was perceived as a provisional way out for this dilemma with Morgenthau and 
other realists praising David Mitrany’s A Working Peace System (1946). As stated by 
Scheuerman echoing E.H. Carr (but also Morgenthau),  
[f]unctional organization not only contributed to the creation of a 
postnational society which alone might successfully undergird stable 
political organization beyond the nation-state; it also checked 
potentially dangerous centralizing tendencies (2010: 261).  
Additionally, it also had the ingredients for the establishment of post-national cooperative 
relations that could cut across multinational blocs, thus preventing the division of the world 
along large polities that would degenerate into empires responsible for even worse atrocities 
than what had been seen during the Second World War.  
In that sense, the European integration project could be understood as containing the seeds 
for both the world’s destruction and its post-national future. By following a functionalist 
path, Europe was creating the possibility of generating a post-national society that could then 
evolve towards a post-national sovereign. That, however, could only result from ‘an act of 
will’ (Scheuerman 2011: 91) and not as some sort of spin-off of economic and social 
cooperative mechanisms devised under the functionalist Schuman Plan. Such act of will is 
still to be accomplished. A European grand strategy would be an important step in that 
regard. 
The EU, Grand Strategy and the possibility of politics 
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 A grand strategy results from a political act that ‘entails calibrating means and ends, 
capabilities and objectives, on the basis of an understanding of the structural context within 
which the actor is situated’ (Hyde-Price 2007: 46), leading to ‘the definition and ranking of 
preferences, i.e. goals and objectives’ (Hyde-Price 2007: 46). Its ‘overarching strategic aim 
must be to establish a societal order that can respond to social and political challenges with a 
minimum of warfare’ (Neumann and Heikka 2005: 13). It ultimately stands for its values and 
serves the materialisation of its interests. In that context, an EU grand strategy could be 
understood ‘as a general plan for, or process of, integrating the policies and resources of the 
EU to protect and advance its core or vital interests’ (Smith 2011: 147).  
The last decade has seen the EU approve a significant number of documents labelled as 
strategies (e.g. EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, EU Internal Security Strategy, EU Cyber 
Security Strategy, EU Maritime Security Strategy – see Edwards 2013 for a critique). From 
all of those, the 2003 European Security Strategy would arguably be the one that more 
closely resembles a grand strategy. The so-called Solana document is an important element 
in the building up of the EU’s international profile. However, it does not identify any clear 
value and interests that it should defend (Biscop et al. 2009: 9). Additionally, it does not 
attempt to combine the different elements and policies of the EU in the definition of a 
strategy that safeguards what its Member States are no longer able to do on their own: ‘at the 
global level, all Member States are small States’ (Biscop et al. 2009: 16). Finally, it is clearly 
outdated and does not consider institutional innovations, such as the creation of the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) (Emmanouilidies 2011: 195). With the absence of a grand 
strategy, the EU fails to have a document that codifies the fulfilment of its vital interests 
(Biscop and Coelmont 2011) and the tools to accomplish them in the world.  
As it stands, not only the EU does not have a grand strategy, as the document that most 
closely resembles one, the 2003 European Security Strategy, puts forward a groundless 
normative vision of the EU’s international actorness arguing that, for instance, when acting 
together with the United States (US), both the EU and the US can be ‘a formidable force for 
good in the world’ (2003: 13). The idea of being a ‘force for good’, or a ‘normative power’ 
(Manners 2002) is certainly something that contradicts any classical realist reading of what 
the EU should be and do. As argued by Rynning, classical realists would worry that this 
‘may result in reckless policy’ (2011: 35) devised without the clear definition of a grand 
strategy, and with a significant ‘democratic deficit’ (Bickerton 2007: 25). As Chris Bickerton 
accurately points out, ‘there is no unified foreign policy that pursues a pan-European interest 
and that draws its forward momentum from a direct connection with a European “people”’ 
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 (2007: 37). Stanley Hoffman, highlights this last point, when referring to how the EU defines 
its security policy: 
 
Although diplomacy comes traditionally ‘from the top’, security policy 
requires a public consensus; but 50 years after the Schuman plan, there 
still is no ‘European public space’ – there is only a juxtaposition of 
national public spaces, capped by a jumble of intergovernmental and 
supranational bureaucracies (2000: 198). 
The absence of a grand strategy where the EU’s vital interests are clearly identifiable in, and 
from which it is possible to establish a process of permanent self-reflection and critique, 
means the EU lacks a firm ground from which to define its international actorness and its 
citizens lack a clear guideline from which to judge its actions.  
An EU grand strategy would act as a political viewpoint for its citizens as, quoting Vibeke 
Tjalve, ‘only when a political system defines clear political viewpoints may counter-views be 
provoked’ (2011: 446). In the EU’s case, that demands a thorough exercise of identification 
and prioritisation of Europe’s interests (Copsey 2015: 187). But how far has the EU gone that 
regard? 
 
A window of opportunity 
As mentioned in the introduction, member states have decided in December 2013 to trigger a 
process that could, potentially lead to a more robust and encompassing strategic framework. 
The world (and the EU) has significantly changed since 2003, and the current geopolitical 
context seems to dictate the need for a strategic review. The May 18th Foreign Affairs 
Council Conclusions on CSDP highlight the instability in the EU’s vicinity – from Libya to 
Ukraine – together with emergence of new security challenges as justifications for the EU to 
assume ‘increased responsibilities to act as a security provider, at the international level and 
in particular in the neighbourhood’ (Council 2015: 2). In that regard, it welcomes the 
ongoing strategic review that could potentially lead to a ‘broad European strategy on foreign 
and security policy issues’ that could ‘identify and describe EU interests, priorities and 
objectives, existing and evolving threats, challenges and opportunities, and the EU 
instruments and means to meet them’ (Council 2015: 2). 
According to the High Representative, the review ‘will cover the context against which the 
level of ambition can be set, taking account of interests and values, the overall security 
environment, the consequent need to project force and the available resources.’ (High 
Representative 2015: 2). Both the changes that have been introduced with the new 
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 Commission (such as the creation of the Commissioners’ Group on External Action, bringing 
together different DGs involved in EU’s external relations) and the Action Plan on the EU’s 
Comprehensive Approach, highlight the EU’s intention of becoming a more coherent actor in 
the international stage. The ongoing strategic review is very much seen within that context. 
From a progressive realist perspective, we could identify three main challenges to this 
process and eventual outcome that if unaddressed will mean the 2016 Strategy will be as 
weak as its 2003 version.  
The first challenge has to do with the current political climate in Europe. The electorate in 
many European countries is quite sceptical of any new EU-related initiatives and national 
governments are obviously weary of being seen as too pro-Europeanxi. This has deep 
implications for both the development of a strategy and for its materialisation. Although 
there seems to be an EU-wide consensus that a new strategy is needed, there is the strong 
possibility that such a document will not be more than a collection of general remarks and 
toothless assertions that do not link the EU’s external activities to any clear notion of 
European interest and that, when materialised, will not lead to any significant commitment 
from member states. The balance between taking on board the interests of 28 member states 
while focusing on the holistic European interest will thus be a key exercise.  
Second, in order to become a central document in European politics, the new strategy needs 
to be embedded in the EU’s regular political process. As it stands, the current strategic 
review is completely ad-hoc, both chronologically and procedurally. For Europeans to be 
able to engage with it, they need to understand its importance and purpose; they need to see 
the EU as an actor with a strategic vision. That is what, for example, the US National 
Security Strategy is primarily for (Andersson 2015: 1). As written by Antonio Missiroli, the 
current director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies,  
 
an increasing insecure European public is being bombarded by 
simplistic messages and unrealistic slogans. All external policies begin 
at home. They need to be supported by a public opinion which is better 
informed of the nature of the risks the EU is confronting and the 
response that may be necessary to main the achievements of the past 
decades and defend both our interests and our values (2015: 4). 
 
This process of clarification is not something that can only happen whenever member states 
decide to create or update a strategy; it needs to be a continuous one.  
Finally, the current strategy needs to be seen as the cornerstone of all the EU’s political 
activity. Specialised strategies should derive from it and national strategies should have it 
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 into due consideration. Otherwise it will just be one among many European documents with 
limited value.    
A strategy of vague lowest common denominators would be a missed opportunity to provide 
some grounding to the EU’s actions in the world and, more importantly, to offer a solid basis 
for the European citizens to perceive, discuss and contest the priorities and interests that 
should guide the EU as an international actor. From this perspective, the current process of 
defining a a global or grand strategy acquires a quasi-existential importance for the future of 
the European integration process. 
 
Conclusion 
This article attempted to bring the latest research on classical realism to the debate of the 
EU’s role as an international actor. Its starting normative concern was very much in line with 
Nathaniel Cooper’s when he refers to the ‘imperfect’ European integration as offering ‘the 
peoples of Europe their best, indeed only, change of being able to cope successfully with the 
big-picture economic and global challenges that they are facing in the 21st century issues 
[…]’ (2015: 163). 
As we had the opportunity to see, there is a progressive and normative element in authors 
such as Carr, Morgenthau or Niebuhr that had been partially silenced by neorealism, 
rephrased by neoclassical realists, and eventually fully recovered by authors such as 
Scheuerman and Williams, that can contribute to expose the political and ethical limits of the 
EU’s external action. In the absence of clearly defined interests, and of a grand strategy that 
outlines them, the EU acts and intervenes according to the moment, usually dependent on US 
policy, and without the recognition, debate or approval of its citizens. The identification of 
when and where to act is set independently of any notion of European interest.  
Contrary to the EU’s current practice, there is a thread that links grand strategy, interest and 
legitimacy that needs to be considered as a whole. The EU’s external relations should be 
entirely based on the fulfilment of those interests. In the same vein, such interests cannot be 
the result of closed-door sessions with experts, but rather of an intense European-wide 
debate. According to Vibeke Tjalve, for authors such as Morgenthau and Lippmann, it was 
fundamental in the US of the Vietnam War years to ‘resurrect a new attitude amongst the 
public, which viewed civic participation and critique as a necessary and constructive 
development’ (2008: 124). Considering that we live in a period in which ‘there is uncertainty 
about the Union’s new raison d’être’ (Emmanouilidis, 2011: 182) such steps may well be 
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 According to Biscop and Coelmont, “[v]ital interests are those that determine the very survival of the EU’s 
social model, which is based on the core values of security, prosperity, democracy and equality” (2011: 17). 
ii
 The Foreign Affairs (Defence) Council has set April 2015 as the deadline for the report (2014: 4). 
iii Following Joel H. Rosenthal, ethics is here understood as “the process by which sources of morality (or 
traditions) are digested and applied to problems of the social world” (1999: 3). 
iv According to Scheuerman, this category “not only aptly sets this group of mid-century Realists apart from the 
politically and institutionally conservative Realism of, say, Butterfield or Kissinger, but it also properly 
highlights the neglected institutionally reformist and oftentimes left-leaning political character of their rich body 
of thought” (2011: 7). 
v
 For more on the concept, see Habermas 2001 and Risse 2010. 
vi
 As argued by the former, ‘[t]he interpretation and use of “classical” thinkers in intellectual and political 
debate is never a wholly innocent process. It always reflects its historical genesis and context of current 
concerns’ (2007: 5). 
vii
 Aas argued by Robert Art’s analysis of the immediate post-Cold War context in Europe: ‘the multiple actors 
bearing on Europe’s security policies, the importance of national interests and differing perspectives, and the 
hedging policies toward the United States, Russia, and Germany – represent the important underlying forces 
that have shaped balance of power considerations in Europe’s security policies since 1990’ (2004: 186). 
 
viii John Mearsheimer’s prognosis has by now been discarded (Hyde-Price 2007: 4) as ‘an ahistorical view of 
Europe that is not equipped to critique political realities or the compromises between power and morality’ 
(Kenealy and Kostagiannis 2013: 226), but one is certainly left thinking whether, in the context of the current 
European political crisis, we are moving dangerously closer to his prognosis: ‘The United Kingdom, France, 
Italy, and Germany would have to build up their own military forces and provide for their own security. In 
effect, they would all become great powers, making Europe multipolar and raising the ever-present possibility 
that they might fight among themselves. And Germany would probably become a potential hegemon and thus 
the main source of worry’ (Mearsheimer 2001: 52). 
ix As Barry Posen concludes in his pessimistic understanding of European security: “Should ESDP progress, as 
it well might, given the causes at work, it seems likely that Europe will prove a less docile ally of the United 
States in a decade or two” (2006: 186).  
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 x
 Aron, according to Daniel Mahoney, “recognized that a united Europe must be political, that it must be able 
both to defend itself and to carry out serious global responsibilities” (1992: 134). 
xi
 As pointed out by Nick Witney et al. ‘With the financial and economic crisis far from over, introspection, 
defensiveness, and mutual resentments colour the outlooks of too many member states’ (2014: 6)  
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